Myths, Fads, and False Economies:
How NOT to Get Secure Systems


Eugene Spafford
Purdue University

November 1, 2002
2400 Sennott Square
10:30 am

ABSTRACT

It is clear from reading any newspaper or magazine that there is a real problem with the security of information systems. Viruses, break-ins, spam, identity theft, and concerns with cyberterrorism are all on the rise. Yet, with over 50 years of experience with building security tools and systems, why aren't things better than they are?

The answer is that the field has been plagued by a number of mistaken beliefs, some bordering on the realm of superstition. If you believe that using strong cryptography provides good security, that open source is more secure than proprietary code, that the next release will be more secure than the current code, that full disclosure prevents break-ins, or that better firewalls are the answer, then you have fallen victim to the myths.

In this talk, I will discuss some of the pervasive (and incorrect) beliefs that make building and operating secure systems such a difficult task.

BIO

Gene Spafford is a Professor of Computer Sciences at Purdue University, where he has been on the faculty since 1987. His current research interests are primarily in the areas of information security, computer crime investigation and information ethics. He also has a courtesy appointment as a Professor of Philosophy at Purdue.

Spaf (as he is known to his friends, colleagues, and students) is director of the Purdue CERIAS (Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security), and was the founder and director of the (superseded) COAST Laboratory.

Spaf is also involved in a number of professional societies and activities outside Purdue, including serving on the Board of Directors of the Computing Research Association and as co-chair of the ACM's US Public Policy Committee.


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